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Abstract—Copresence verification based on context can im-
prove usability and strengthen security of many authentication
and access control systems. By sensing and comparing their
surroundings, two or more devices can tell whether they are
copresent and use this information to make access control
decisions. To the best of our knowledge, all context-based copres-
ence verification mechanisms to date are susceptible to context-
manipulation attacks. In such attacks, a distributed adversary
replicates the same context at the (different) locations of the
victim devices, and induces them to believe that they are
copresent. In this paper we propose DoubleEcho, a context-
based copresence verification technique that leverages acoustic
Room Impulse Response (RIR) to mitigate context-manipulation
attacks. In DoubleEcho, one device emits a wide-band audible
chirp and all participating devices record reflections of the chirp
from the surrounding environment. Since RIR is, by its very
nature, dependent on the physical surroundings, it constitutes
a unique location signature that is hard for an adversary to
replicate. We evaluate DoubleEcho by collecting RIR data with
various mobile devices and in a range of different locations. We
show that DoubleEcho mitigates context-manipulation attacks
whereas all other approaches to date are entirely vulnerable to
such attacks. DoubleEcho detects copresence (or lack thereof)
in roughly 2 seconds and works on commodity devices.
Index Terms—room impulse response, copresence verification,
context-manipulation attack, acoustic, reverberation time
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of authentication mechanisms leverage copres-
ence of the (alleged) prover and the verifier to either strengthen
authenticity or improve usability [6], [9], [10], [13], [33]. For
example, in the context of IoT, pairing of two or more devices
may only be allowed among those that are copresent. Similarly,
payment systems may mitigate fraudulent in-store transactions
by checking that the payment card being used and the mobile
device of the legitimate card-holder are close to each other [9],
[13].
Copresence may be verified, for example, by exchanging
an unpredictable value over a short-range communication
channel. The verifier device transmits a random value over
Bluetooth or NFC, and challenges the prover device to echo
that same value out of band.1 However, such a naı¨ve solution is
vulnerable to relay attacks. The latter involves a pair of victim
devices far away from each other and a distributed attacker,
copresent with each of the victims. The attacker simply relays
messages between the victim devices so that they conclude
to be copresent. Relay attacks have been demonstrated in
research papers [6], [7] and reported in the news.2
Distance bounding techniques, e.g., [1], [2], [6], [20] may be
used against relay attacks. However, distance bounding relies
on accurate measurements of round-trip times between the
two devices; it therefore needs to be deployed at the lower
levels of the communication stack, and often requires special
hardware [20].
An alternative approach to copresence verification, that is
easier to deploy than distance bounding, is based on context.
The rationale behind context-based copresence verification is
that two copresent devices should perceive similar context.
Previous work has demonstrated the feasibility of using dif-
ferent context modalities, such as audio [9], [10], [27], radio
signals [8], [33], or other features of the physical environment
like humidity or pressure [9], [23]. For example, in [9], [10],
[27] two devices record environmental noise and compare their
recordings to tell whether they are copresent or not.
Yet, depending on the context modality used to verify cop-
resence, a context-manipulation attack may be feasible. Sim-
ilar to a relay attack, a context-manipulation attack involves
two far away victim devices and an adversary that is copresent
with each of them. Here, the adversary manipulates the context
at the locations of the two devices so that they conclude to
be copresent. For example, if copresence verification is based
on audio [9], [10], [27], the adversary sitting next to each
of the two (far away) victim devices, may simply play an
arbitrary audio clip at both locations [25]; the two devices will
record the same audio and conclude that they are copresent by
comparing their recordings.
To the best of our knowledge, no context-based copresence
verification mechanism tolerates context-manipulation attacks.
1The out of band channel is authenticated, e.g., by means of a shared key.
2http://uk.businessinsider.com/thieves-unlock-a-mercedes-using-device-
relays-keys-signal-west-midlands-police-2017-11
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For example, many copresence verification mechanisms [11],
[17], [30], [33] leverage context based on GPS, Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth signals. Previous work has shown that manipulation
of such context modalities is feasible [24], [28], [30], [36].
Audio-based copresence schemes [9], [10], [27], [30] are also
susceptible to adversarial manipulation of the context [24],
[25]. Copresence verification based on physical context [23],
[35] is not secure to context-manipulation attacks either [24].
Real-world applications relying on context-based copresence
verification (e.g., GPS3 or radio beacons4) are similarly vul-
nerable to these adversarial manipulations.
A few recent proposals [24], [30] address context-
manipulation adversaries, by combining multiple sensor
modalities and by assuming that the adversary cannot ma-
nipulate all modalities at the same time (e.g., the adversary
can manipulate Wi-Fi signals but it cannot manipulate GPS
signals). Yet, if the adversary manipulates all modalities,
the schemes of [24], [30] become completely vulnerable to
context-manipulation attacks (see Table 2 in [24]).
Our contributions. We aim at designing a context-based
copresence verification mechanism that mitigates context-
manipulation attacks. We focus on audio-based copresence
verification because of the wide availability of microphones
and speakers on commodity devices. In this settings, we
study how to leverage the physical characteristics of the
location where the protocol is executed to mitigate context-
manipulation attacks. We observe that in nature many animals
use echolocation to “make sense” of the physical environments
around them. Bats emit high frequency sounds and listen to
how they are reflected by the environment; dolphins also use
a similar echolocation technique. Inspired by these, we make
use of Room Impulse Response (RIR), which depends on
both sound waves within a physical enclosure as well as the
shape and the materials of the enclosure. Sound travels via
multiple paths from the source to the receiver. These paths are
significantly influenced by the boundaries and the obstacles in
the enclosing space. Thus, we conjecture that RIR constitutes
a unique location signature that is hard for an adversary to
replicate.
We instantiate the idea above in DoubleEcho, a mecha-
nism for copresence verification based on RIR. DoubleEcho
mitigates context-manipulation attacks by minimizing the
chances that an adversary may reproduce the same context
at two different locations. In DoubleEcho, one device
emits a short (2 seconds), wide-band audible chirp and all
participating devices (the playing device and one or more
listening devices) record reflections of the chirp from the
surrounding environment. DoubleEcho extracts features on
different frequency bands from each recording and compares
those features to determine whether the devices are copresent
or not. Since RIR is, by its very nature, dependent on the
physical surroundings, DoubleEcho can effectively mitigate
3http://www.solidpass.com/authentication-methods/mobile-location-
authentication.html
4https://securechannels.com/products/authentication/
relay and context-manipulation attacks. The same chirp signal
played at two different locations yields different RIRs, unless
the two locations are very similar (e.g., same shape, building
materials, furniture, etc.).
We evaluate DoubleEcho and compare it with previous
work by using various mobile devices and in a range of
different environments. DoubleEcho is sound with a false
negative rate (as low as 0.021) similar to the one shown by
similar proposals [10], [27]. In face of a context-manipulation
attack, DoubleEcho is secure with a false positive rate that
ranges between 0.089 and 0.189, whereas all other approaches
to date are completely vulnerable. Finally, DoubleEcho can
be easily deployed on commodity devices — it only requires
microphones on all participating devices and a speaker on one
of them — and takes roughly 2 seconds to detect copresence.
The dataset we used for the evaluation of DoubleEcho is
publicly available for research use [29]. Source code for data
collection and RIR extraction is also available upon request.
II. SECURE CONTEXTUAL COPRESENCE VERIFICATION
The notion of copresence may change depending on the
application scenario. In some applications, copresence means
that two devices are a few centimeters away (e.g., NFC
payments). Others may label as copresent a pair of devices
that are a few meters apart (e..g, bluetooth applications).
Similar to previous work we consider that two devices are
copresent if they are at most half a meter away and within
the same room. This design choice suits applications such as
unlocking a desktop using a mobile phone when it is in close
proximity [31] and managing meeting memberships [27].
We consider an application scenario where two devices—
prover P and verifier V— leverage context-based copresence
verification. The protocol starts by the prover sending a
copresence verification request to the verifier. At this time both
devices measure the environment via one or more available
sensors and the prover sends its measurement to the verifier.
Transmission happens out-of-band on a channel authenticated,
e.g., by means of a shared key. Finally, the verifier compares
its measurement with the one received by the prover to decide
whether the two devices are copresent. Replay protection can
be achieved if the verifier sends a random nonce at the start
of the protocol, and the prover piggybacks that same nonce in
the measurement sent to the verifier.
In this setting, a true (resp. false) positive happens when
P and V are copresent (resp. not copresent) and V’s output
is “copresent”. Similarly, a true (resp. false) negative happens
when P and V are not copresent (resp. copresent) and V’s
output is “not copresent”.
Clearly, the copresence verification protocol should be
sound, i.e., exhibit a low rate of false negatives.
Threat model. Let prover P and verifier V be the two victim
devices and assume they are at different locations. The goal
of the adversary is to run the copresence verification protocol
between P and V and make V conclude that the two devices
are copresent.
All previous proposals for context-based copresence verifi-
cation [9], [10], [23], [30], [33] assume a standard Dolev-Yao
attacker [5], where the adversary controls the communication
network but cannot break cryptographic primitives, nor it can
compromise the victim devices. Further, the adversary is not
allowed to manipulate the context that the devices sense to
detect copresence.
We consider a stronger adversary that is copresent with both
devices and we allow for context-manipulation attacks. That is
we allow the adversary to manipulate the context at P and at V.
Since we use audio to verify copresence, we let the adversary
control the noise in the environment of the prover and in the
one of the verifier.
Therefore, the adversary succeeds if, while under attack, the
copresence verification protocol outputs a false positive (i.e.,
V concludes that P is copresent while the two devices are
actually far away).
Naturally, the copresence verification mechanism should be
secure, i.e., exhibit a low rate of false positives.
III. ROOM IMPULSE RESPONSE
An impulse response is the response of a system to an
impulsive stimulus. In this work, we consider sound systems
and their acoustic environments. By “system” we refer to the
collective of involved parts such as the space, walls and ob-
stacles within a room, but also the speakers and microphones
on the devices.
When emitted from a speaker, a sound is distributed, albeit
unevenly, in every direction, traveling multiple paths of dif-
ferent lengths. This results in multiple arrivals at the receiver.
Sound that travels the shortest path (direct sound) arrives first
and is the loudest. Sound that has traveled through other paths
starts arriving soon after, with delay directly and loudness
inversely proportional to the path length. Along all paths, air
and surfaces absorb some of the sound energy.
An acoustic impulse response is created by how the sound
is reflected along this multitude of paths; how much sound
is delayed, how much sound is weakened, how much sound
energy is received etc. The paths, and hence the impulse
response, is heavily affected by the enclosing space such as
walls, ceiling, obstacles, the power of the sound source, and
the position and orientation of both the sound source and the
receiver. Theoretically, two non-identical rooms should not
have identical impulse responses.
Fig. 1 describes how an RIR looks like in the time domain.
The propagation delay is the time it takes for direct sound
to travel from the source to the receiver. The first part of the
RIR is the arrival of the direct sound. After that, the earliest
reflected sounds (lowest order reflections) start arriving, fol-
lowed by sound traveling along a multitude of longer paths
(higher order reflections, reverberant space). The noise floor
is the point where the receiver can no longer distinguish the
reverberant sound from background noise. Energy absorption
by air and surface materials causes reverberant sound to decay
as a function of time (and distance). In practice, the difference
between direct sounds and early reflections might not be as
arrival of direct sound
reverberation decay
noise floor
lowest order (early) reflections
Time (ms)0 500 ms
propagation delay
dB
-75
-70
-65
-60
-55
-50
-45
-40
-35
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-10
Fig. 1. RIR representation in the time domain.
clear as in Fig. 1. Reverberant decay is usually measured in
the range from 5 dB below the level of direct sound to a point
of 60 dB below that on the backward energy curve.
We now briefly describe standard features of RIR signals;
these features are later selected by a classification model and
used in DoubleEcho.
Reverberation time (RT), the most common RIR feature,
represents the time it takes for a reverberating signal to decay
until it can no longer be distinguished from background noise.
RT can be a single value even when measured for a wide band
signal, for example a sweep from 20 Hz to 20 kHz. It can also
be computed for different frequency bands separately.
A band covers a specific range of frequencies, with a
lower bound fl and an upper bound fh. Octave bands are
identified by their middle frequency f0. A band is one octave
in width when the upper band frequency is twice that of
the lower band frequency, fl = f0/21/2, fh = f0 × 21/2. An
one-third octave band has fl = f0/(21/2)1/3 = f0/21/6 and
fh = f0 × (21/2)1/3 = f0 × 21/6. Reverberation time varies
for different frequency bands, and hence it should be indicated
if the RT applies for a specific band.
One of the most accurate method to compute RT is based on
studying the decay curve. The energy curve is a curve obtained
by backwards integration of the squared impulse response,
which ideally starts from a point where the response falls into
the noise floor.
The slope of Schroeder curve is used to measure how fast
the impulse response decays. For instance, RT60 is the time it
takes for a sound to decay by 60 dB. This is the standard base
for measuring RT according to Sabine’s reverberation equation
empirically developed in the late 1890s.5 In practice, the level
of direct sound might be less than 60 dB above the noise floor.
In such cases, RT30 and RT20 are used instead. RT30 is the
time a sound would decay 60 dB when extrapolated from a
30 dB decay range in the Schroeder curve (often from -5 dB
to -35 dB). RT20 accordingly is extrapolated from a 20 dB
decay range (from -5 dB to -25 dB).
5https://www.acoustics-engineering.com/html/sabin.html
Beside RT, there are other RIR features used for particular
purposes of acoustical analysis. Early Decay Time (EDT) is
derived from reverberation decay curve, conventionally in the
section between 0 dB and 10 dB below the level of direct
sound. EDT therefore is the reverberation time measured over
the first 10 dB of the decay. It gives information of overall
signal clarity and intelligibility in a room. Early-to-late energy
ratio is a measure of the sound energy arriving within some
specified interval after direct sound (first n milliseconds) over
the energy in the remaining part of the impulse response. For
example, clarity ratios C10, C35, C50, C80 are the early-to-
late ratios (in dB) at 10, 35, 50, and 80 milliseconds as split
times. Direct-to-Reverberant energy Ratio (DRR) is another
useful measure for assessing the acoustic configuration.
IV. DOUBLEECHO
DoubleEcho has been designed for contextual copresence
verification using RIR measurements. As RIR remains stable
across a single environment, it is more resilient to context-
manipulation attacks than previous contextual copresence sys-
tems. In the following we describe our overall system design,
after which we detail how the RIR is measured.
A. System design
DoubleEcho uses audio as the context to verify copres-
ence of two devices and leverages RIR to mitigate context-
manipulation attacks. We focus on audio for two main reasons.
First, sensors to capture audio signals (i.e., microphones) are
widely available on commodity devices. Second, an audio
signal is heavily affected by the surrounding space; thus,
acoustic RIR may allow to tell whether two devices are within
the same room.
Further, DoubleEcho accommodates scenarios where the
entropy of context data is insufficient (e.g., a silent room), by
injecting a stimulus (i.e., a chirp signal) in the environment.
Therefore, we assume prover and verifier to be equipped with
microphones and at least one of them to be equipped with a
speaker.
The following steps show how DoubleEcho works when
run between a prover device P and a verifier device V. We
assume that P and V have access to an authenticated channel
(i.e., share a secret key).
1) Start. The protocol may be triggered by either P or V.
This is done by sending a well-known message over the
authenticated channel. During this stage, V also sends a
random nonce to P.6
2) Playing and Recording. The device with a speaker
(without loss of generality we assume V has a speaker)
plays a known audio clip S; at the same time both
devices record audio in the environment via their mi-
crophones.
3) RIR. V (resp. P) computes the RIR hV (resp. hP) based
on the original audio clip S (the system’s input) and the
signal recorded via its microphone (the system’s output).
6The nonce is used as a challenge to prevent replay attacks.
P sends its RIR hP to V via the authenticated channel,
along with the nonce received previously from V.
4) Comparison. V compares the nonce sent at the begin-
ning of the protocol with the one received from P. If
the two nonces are different, V assumes a replay attack
and aborts. Otherwise, V compares hV computed locally
with hP received by P to decide whether the two devices
are copresent or not.
During the last step of the protocol, V compares its RIR
with the one received from P. The comparison mechanism
clearly has a dramatic impact on the performance of the
system. That is, the comparison function should enable V to
reliably detect whether P is copresent or not. DoubleEcho
extract features from RIR and feeds them to a binary classifier
that outputs a copresence verdict. In the remaining of this
section we illustrate how we measure RIR; the next section
provides details about the classifier and the features used in
DoubleEcho.
B. Measuring RIR
A common method for measuring RIR is to apply a known
input signal and measure the system’s output. Assuming the
system to be linear time-invariant,7 the output signal x(t) is
the result of convoluting the input signal s(t) and the RIR
h(t) (i.e., x(t) = s(t) ∗ h(t), where t is time and ∗ denotes
convolution). Hence RIR can be extracted by deconvoluting
input and output.
The measurement method, therefore, depends on the excita-
tion signal and the deconvolution technique. Both the excita-
tion signal and the deconvolution technique should maximize
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and allow to eliminate non
linear artifacts in the deconvolved impulse response.
Among various methods to measure RIR, we opt for the
sine sweep technique because it overcomes the limitation of
having distortion artifact when the condition of linear time
variance is not fulfilled. This technique uses a linear (or an
exponential) time-growing frequency sweep as the excitation
signal. The output of the system in response to the sine sweep
input consists of both the linear response to the excitation and
the harmonic distortion at various orders due to non-linearity
(Fig. 2). A deconvolution of the recorded output can be used
to compute the RIR. The linear impulse response is the first
order harmonic in the deconvolved result.
The steps to measure RIR in DoubleEcho are as follows:
1) Convert the recorded signal (system output) x(t) and the
generated signal (system input) s(t) from time domain to
frequency domain by computing discrete Fourier trans-
form (FFT). The FFT of a signal represents amplitudes
and phases of individual frequencies in the signal.
2) Compute their deconvolution to get the transfer function.
This is done by computing the time reversal of the input
signal and convolve it with the recorded signal using an
FFT based method (Matlab fftfilt). The transfer function
7That is, the system exhibits a linear relationship between input and output
that does not change over time.
1st order harmonic
2nd order harmonic
3rd order harmonic
Input signal -  a linear sine sweep
Output signal with harmonic distortion
Fig. 2. Distortion artifact.
shows how each frequency has been affected by the
system.
3) Convert the transfer function from the frequency domain
to the time domain by inverse FFT to obtain the room
impulse response.
From the RIR, we extract a series of acoustic features
(RT60, EDT, D/R, C10, C35, C50, C80) across 32 frequency
bands from 0 to 22050 Hz, including 1 wide-band, 10 octave
bands, and 21 one-third octave bands. Features from these
bands yield a vector of 224 features for each audio sample.
V. EVALUATION
We started evaluation of DoubleEcho by tuning system
parameters and designing experiments. Next we ran binary
classification to assess the performance of copresence verifica-
tion resulted by DoubleEcho. Given results, we conducted
extra experiments to compare DoubleEcho with previous
work and elaborated its advantages.
A. Parameters tuning
Copresence. The physical distance that defines copresence
may vary from application to application. In our experiments,
we consider that two devices are copresent if (1) they are in
the same room, and (2) the distance between them is at most
half a meter.
Excitation level. According to Section III, DoubleEcho
must ensure the power of the audio signal to be at least 40-50
dB above that of the noise floor level, of which 20-30 dB to
measure reverberation time and 10 dB to separate reverberation
and noise floor. In detail, we evaluate reverberant decay over
a range, starting from 5 dB below the direct sound down to
20 or 30 dB below the starting point. One option is to emit
the excitation signal at the highest level that the source device
can achieve. However, if the signal is too loud for the receiver,
recording will be clipped. A clipped signal is a measurement
error that prevents extraction of RIR. The challenge is thus to
ensure enough excitation of the acoustic space, while at the
same time avoiding the clipping effect.
Measurement duration. A sweep of 500 ms or 1s is sufficient
for measuring small spaces such as kitchens or offices. Larger
rooms would need longer reverberation times (e.g., a couple
of seconds for medium-size rooms like classrooms, up to a
few seconds for large indoor spaces). In our experiments we
use a sweep of two seconds to cover a wider range of rooms.
In practice, if a measurement does not return good results, the
parties may increase the duration of the audio clip and re-run
the measurement.
Audio sample and RIR features. The signal we use is a linear
sine sweep from 0 to 22050 Hz during two seconds. Recording
is done at 44100 Hz 16 bit PCM. To ensure that initializing
the audio system does not cut away from our signal, we pad
the signal with one second of silence in the beginning and two
seconds in the end, making the full sample five seconds long.
Post-processing for recorded signal. We align the recorded
signal with the original generated signal (using signal cross-
correlation) and remove the parts before the beginning of the
sine sweep and after 500 milliseconds past the end of the
sine sweep, leaving us with just the sweep and the reverber-
ation. We then normalize the recorded signal to account for
decreased volume caused by the recording process.
Linear RIR extraction. The first order harmonic is detected
based on the highest peak in the energy decay curve. We find
the highest peak and cut from 100 ms before that until 750 ms
after. Background noise level is determined by energy level of
10 ms before direct sound of the first order harmonic.
B. Experiment setting
Android application. We developed an Android app and a
backend server to facilitate collection of audio samples. The
protocol is triggered by the server that instructs one device to
emit a chirp signal, and all devices, including the emitter, to
record. After recording, the devices send the recorded sample
to the backend server.
Triggering the protocol over the network allows us to record
on many devices at the same time without needing to tap
buttons on their screens, and makes synchronizing the emitting
and recording devices easier. To account for the different
amounts of delay that the devices may experience and to make
sure that the entire signal gets played through the speaker,
we prepared our audio files with a few seconds of silence
padding both before and after the signal. We also implemented
a loudness calibration feature to avoid unwanted effects such
as signal clipping.
Locations and devices. We collected data with a set of
16 smartphones and tablets spanning different brands and
models (Google Nexus 5X LG, Sony Xperia Z5 compact, Sony
Xperia XA, Samsung Galaxy S7, HTC One A9s, Huawei P8,
ZTE, and Lenovo Phab2). Data collection took place at two
geographic locations (Helsinki and Darmstadt) and spanned 20
different rooms including offices, kitchen, corridor, classroom,
meeting room, living room, bed room, stairway, computer
room.
TABLE I
BENIGN COPRESENT AND ATTACK NON-COPRESENT PAIRS.
Experiments No. benign pairs No. attack pairs
Dataset1 203 8120
Dataset2.1 228 5725
Dataset2.2 189 3780
Dataset2.3 208 7350
Dataset2.4 220 6952
Dataset3 392 26605
Procedure. For each room, we took a subset of the devices
available, randomly chose the emitting device, and placed the
remaining devices in a circle around it at a distance of roughly
half a meter. We then played and recorded 5 audio samples,
thereby emulating 5 executions of the copresence verification
protocol.
Datasets. We split collected data in two datasets, based on
whether data collection was performed in Helsinki (Dataset1)
or in Darmstadt (Dataset2). For each room we used in Darm-
stadt, we repeated the data collection in four different locations
within that room. Resulting datasets are labelled Dataset2.1,
Dataset2.2, Dataset2.3, and Dataset2.4 (where Dataset2 is the
union of those four). We used four locations per room in order
to understand whether the location within a room affects the
performance of DoubleEcho.
Our data collection totalled 32975 pairs of audio samples.
We discarded pairs where recording had failed for any reason
(about 2% of all data samples). Details of datasets are shown
in Table. I; Dataset3 is the result of merging Dataset1 and
Dataset2.
Similar to previous work [23], [30], we use the collected
audio samples to emulate benign as well as adversarial exe-
cutions of the protocol. A benign execution of the protocol is
one where the two devices are truly copresent. An adversarial
execution happens when the two devices are not copresent.
Any pair of samples recorded by two distinct devices (where
one plays an audio clip) at the same time and in the same room
is considered a benign pair. Any pair of samples recorded by
two distinct devices (where one also plays an audio clip) in
two different rooms is considered an attack pair.
The way we build attack pairs allows us to emulate a
context-manipulation attack where prover and verifier are not
copresent, and the adversary plays in the prover’s environment
the (well known) audio clip played by the verifier. We do not
emulate the random nonce sent by the verifier as a challenge.
Nevertheless, an attacker copresent with both the prover and
the verifier could easily relay the verifier’s random nonce to
the prover.
C. Copresence classification
We consider copresence verification as a classification task
for labeling two classes: copresent (positive class) and non-
copresent (negative class). We tested different supervised
learning algorithms and settled with RandomForest which
performs best among all.
Our dataset is heavily imbalanced towards attack pairs
and this comes from the method we use to generate our
benign/attack pairs. We address the imbalance by undersam-
pling the set of attack pairs during training; we use the
RandomUnderSampler algorithm in the Scikit-learn library.
We do not alter the imbalance during testing.
For each sample pair (of both benign and attack pairs), using
their RIR acoustical feature vectors, we compute (component-
wise) the vector of squared differences, yielding a 244-
elements feature vector that are fed to the classifier. Though the
feature vector has 244 elements, many of them are not infor-
mative for copresence and non-copresence classification. We
applied the RandomForestRegressor algorithm implemented in
Scikit-learn to select the 50 (empirically chosen among trials
of 10, 20, 30, 50, 100 top features) most relevant features
out of 244 available. Each training dataset we select 50-top
features accordingly. Due to space limit, we do not list those
selected features for each dataset.
We used 5-fold cross-validation: for each dataset, we ran-
domly divided the data into 5 subsets (folds); 4 subsets were
used for training the model and the remaining subset for
testing. Table II shows the confusion matrix. Notably the false
negative rate (FNR) ranges between 0.021 to 0.106. That is,
when the two devices are copresent, DoubleEcho will fail
to detect copresence no more than 10% of the times. Also,
the false positive rate (FPR) ranges between 0.089 and 0.189
(5 over 6 datasets have FPR less than 12%). That is, in
presence of an adversary, DoubleEcho will fail to detect
attack roughly 12% of the times.
Classification results on datasets 2.1-2.4 show that locations
in rooms for copresent pairs do not affect performance of
the verification mechanism. That is, when two devices are
within proximity of less than half a meter, at different locations
in a room, DoubleEcho predicts copresence with similar
performance.
D. Comparison with previous work
The effectiveness of DoubleEcho is better appreciated
when our proposal is compared to previous work. In particu-
lar, we pick the audio-based copresence verification protocol
of [30] as an alternative to DoubleEcho, and compare
the two proposals in terms of usability, performance, and
deployability. We show that DoubleEcho provides better
security without giving up usability; furthermore, requirements
to deploy DoubleEcho are the same as the ones to deploy
the mechanism of [30].
Table III compares false positive rates (FPR) of
DoubleEcho and [30] evaluated on our datasets. Recall
that a false positive happens when the two devices are not
copresent but the mechanism outputs a copresence verdict.
From the table, it is clear that DoubleEcho mitigates
context-manipulation attacks while the mechanism of [30] is
completely vulnerable to such attacks. We note that the FPR
reported in [30] is 0.093 but the adversary in [30] is not
allowed context-manipulation attacks.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENT RESULTS. NOTATION: COPRESENCE 1, NON-COPRESENCE 0.
Dataset1 Dataset2.1 Dataset2.2 Dataset2.3 Dataset2.4 Dataset3
Prediction
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Ground truth 1 198 5 215 13 185 4 186 22 202 18 379 130 751 7369 728 4997 336 3444 1390 5960 992 6708 2450 24155
FNR 0.025 0.057 0.021 0.106 0.082 0.033
FPR 0.092 0.127 0.089 0.189 0.129 0.092
TABLE III
FPRS COMPARISON OF DOUBLEECHO AND [30].
Datasets [30] DoubleEcho
1 0.995 0.092
2.1 0.996 0.127
2.2 0.999 0.089
2.3 0.995 0.189
2.4 0.998 0.129
3 0.997 0.092
TABLE IV
FNRS COMPARISON OF DOUBLEECHO AND [30].
Datasets [30] DoubleEcho
1 0.000 0.025
2.1 0.004 0.057
2.2 0.005 0.021
2.3 0.005 0.106
2.4 0.000 0.082
3 0.003 0.033
Table IV compares false negative rates (FNR) of
DoubleEcho and [30] evaluated on our datasets. Recall that
a false negative happens when the two devices are copresent
but the mechanism outputs a “non-copresent” verdict. A false
negative hinders usability and it is desirable to have a low
FNR. Both mechanisms show similar FNR across all datasets.
That is, additional security of DoubleEcho is not traded
for usability.
Finally, we note that both methods have the same require-
ments in terms of hardware, duration, energy consumption and
binary classifier.
We did not compare DoubleEcho with other context-
based copresence verification mechanisms that leverage au-
dio [9], [10], [27]. We could not carry out the comparison
because either the code was not available, lack of detailed
description prevented us from replicating the proposed mech-
anism, or simply the considered system model was not com-
parable with the one of DoubleEcho.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss limitations of our evaluation and
possible application domains of DoubleEcho.
We have not controlled background noise levels or tested
with different distances between the devices. All our experi-
ments were made in the presence of an audible excitation sig-
nal emitted by one device. Also, devices were placed at a dis-
tance of roughly half a meter. In future work, we plan to assess
how DoubleEcho performs in presence of (loud) background
noise and when devices are more than half a meter apart.
DoubleEcho uses a wide-band audible chirp for mea-
suring RIR. It may therefore be unsuitable for application
scenarios where users my be uncomfortable with the noise
DoubleEcho generates. A possible solution may be to use
ultra-sounds. Given the limited capacity of commodity devices
to emit and record reflections of high frequency sounds, using
ultra-sound may face several system challenges and we leave
it for future work.
Our evaluation of DoubleEcho focuses on indoor envi-
ronments. We leave a feasibility study of DoubleEcho in
outdoor environments as future work. Measuring RIR in large
spaces may, however, be challenging with commodity devices.
We argue that DoubleEcho can be used in a num-
ber of application domains where it can help to mitigate
context-manipulation attacks. Similar to Sound-Proof [10],
DoubleEcho could be used in two-factor authentica-
tion system to enhance security while retain ease-of-use.
DoubleEcho could be also used for multiple device associa-
tion [27]. During our experiments, we have empirically tested
that DoubleEcho can be effectively used to pair three or
more devices at once. Finally, DoubleEcho can be used
in zero-interaction authentication systems like BlueProxim-
ity++ [31] to mitigate context-manipulation attacks shown
in [24].
Last but not least, we argue that DoubleEcho can de-
tect DoS attacks. With this attack, an adversary can inject
audio in the environment to scramble or confuse record-
ings. DoubleEcho can detect the attack by comparing the
recorded signal with the priorly known input.
VII. RELATED WORK
The two main directions for copresence verification in the
literature are distance bounding (radio distance bounding [1],
[2], [6], [20]; audio distance bounding [18]) and copresence
verification (RF based [11], [14], [17], [33]; audio [9], [10],
[22], [26], [27]; multi-context [16], [23], [30], [31]; and
other context [3], [4], [12], [15]). In this section we discuss
approaches of the latter which are related to our work. For each
approach we will argue why it does not meet our design goals.
Context-based copresence verification. Radio context such
as GPS, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth is commonly used for proximity
verification. Narayanan et al. [17] studied the use of vari-
ous modalities including Wi-Fi broadcast packets and access
points, Bluetooth, GPS, GSM and audio atmospheric gas
for private proximity detection. They concluded that Wi-Fi
performs the most prominently. Krumm et al. [11] proposed
“NearMe” which also uses Wi-Fi features for proximity detec-
tion. Varshavsky et al. [33] presented Amigo to authenticate
copresent devices using various features extracted from Wi-Fi
environment. Although these solutions use the radio environ-
ment in different ways, they all depend on the availability of
deployed base stations.
Acoustic copresence verification has been studied inten-
sively. In existing solutions [9], [10], [22], [27], [30], devices
passively perceive ambient sound, extract its features and
apply them for pairing, copresence verification and authentica-
tion. In these techniques, ambient sound is first recorded and
acoustic features are then extracted. Similarities or distances
of the features, used by a classifier, are computed based on
pre-defined metric. Comparing to other context such as Wi-
Fi, GPS and physical environment context, audio offers several
benefits. Speaker and microphone, required for producing and
capturing audio, are available in most devices from computers
to smartphones and wearable devices. Audio is efficient even
with short recording times, only a few seconds compared to
sometimes minutes for other context types such as Wi-Fi or
GPS. Halevi et al. [9] proposed to use ambient audio for
copresence verification of NFC devices. In their approach,
ambient sounds recorded by a pair of devices in one second are
compared to each other via their maximum cross correlation.
In [22], Schu¨rmann et al. proposed an approach where the
devices extract an audio fingerprint as an energy matrix and
compute the Hamming distance between their matrixes. Their
method need at least 6 seconds of ambient audio to obtain
efficient fingerprint. For automatic group membership mainte-
nance, Tan et al. [27] assumed copresent devices form a group,
and by checking similarity of silence signatures extracted from
ambient sound, membership of a device can be continuously
verified. Sound-Proof [10] also adopted ambient sound for two
factor authentication.
Despite benefits of using audio in copresence verification,
integrity of acoustic ambience is susceptible to adversarial
manipulation [25]. Audio context attackers simply record
audio, transmit it over a high speed channel and replay it
in the victims vicinity. Furthermore, solutions in previous
works largely depend on the quality of ambient sound since
it is passively sensed by participating devices. In many cases
where both devices are in quiet or in noisy environments, the
verification result is not reliable. In addition, some approaches
require to use raw audio data [9], [10], which may raise
privacy concerns. A proposed method that uses only sound
signatures [27] requires long recording duration to obtain
enough features.
Physical environmental context such as temperature, humid-
ity, gas, altitude etc. also have been studied for copresence
verification. In their work [23] Shrestha et al. showed the
feasibility of using such context.
RIR for localization. Room level localization techniques [19],
[21], [32], [34] exploit the intrinsic acoustic properties of
rooms extracted from room impulse response. These ap-
proaches exploit different types of acoustic features for room
localization. In RoomSense [21] Rossi et al. showed that com-
mon audio features are superior to room acoustic features and
their results were primarily based on them. SoundLoc [19] ex-
plored more acoustic features based on room impulse response
including temporal features, spectral features and energetic
features. EchoTag [32] and UbiK [34] use similar acoustic
features based on characteristics of reflections of room impulse
response in frequency domain to fingerprint locations.
Even though echolocation and RIR have been used for
indoor localization and room fingerprint [19], [21], [32],
[34], they have several limitations. First, whether RIR can
be used for copresence verification has not been explored.
Like other context-based copresence verification approaches,
two devices in close proximity should perceive similar RIR.
Second, previous works on room fingerprinting [19], [21] only
show that the same device in different places can identify the
place based on RIR, thus omitting hardware variance. For
copresence verification we need to compare signals of two
copresent devices. When two or more devices are involved,
new challenges emerge such as hardware heterogeneity. Two
different device models might behave differently even if they
are in the same location. In our work, we elaborate such
challenges and show that our system overcomes variance of
hardware. In addition, room fingerprinting approaches require
that the locations have been seen earlier. For copresence
verification, this is an unreasonable assumption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented DoubleEcho, a copresence verification
mechanism based on Room Impulse Response (RIR). To the
best of our knowledge, DoubleEcho is the only context-
based copresence verification mechanism that is robust against
context-manipulation attacks. In DoubleEcho, one device
emits a wide-band audible chirp and all devices record re-
flections of the chirp from the environment. Features extracted
from the recordings are fed to a classifier to make a copresence
decision. Since RIR is, by its very nature, dependent on the
physical surroundings, an adversary may not replicate the same
context for two devices at different locations. By means of
an Android application and an experimental campaign we
have shown that RIR-based copresence verification is feasible
using commodity devices. Results show that DoubleEcho
effectively mitigates context-manipulation attacks with a false
positive rate as low as 0.089. While strengthening security,
DoubleEcho shows a false negative rate in line with similar
proposals. DoubleEcho operates in roughly 2 seconds and
can be used with commodity devices. We expect that our
proposal, experiments and evaluation results open opportu-
nities for further applications relying on secure copresence
verification.
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